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I. INTRODUCTION
A major medical emergency forces a person to seek care at the nearest
hospital. Fortunately, or at least so the person believes, he or she has health
insurance and will only have to pay a deductible and copay. But the insured
may soon find out that he or she may be receiving bills from the medical
* David Stahl is a judicial clerk for the Honorable Cory J. Ciklin at Florida's Fourth
District Court of Appeal. He received his J.D. summa cum laude from Nova Southeastern
University Shepard Broad Law Center in 2010, where he served as Editor-in-Chief of the
Nova Law Review from 2009-2010. He also has a B.A in Biochemistry from Harvard Univer-
sity and an M.B.A from Florida Atlantic University. An earlier version of this article was
written for Professor Kathy L. Cerminiara's Law and Medicine seminar, and he thanks her for
her critical advice with this article.
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providers far in excess of those amounts. The reason is not just that his or
her insurance plan may require a higher copay and deductible when using
out-of-network providers, but also because of a common provision in the
insurance contract to only reimburse bills from out-of-network providers at a
rate which the insurer deems to be "usual and customary." When a bill ar-
rives a few months later, the insured will soon learn that the there is a signif-
icant difference between what the insurer considers to be usual and customa-
ry and what the provider is charging the insured-sometimes the provider's
charge will be more than twice what the insurer has determined to be usual
and customary and the insured may be responsible for this difference.' The
practice by providers of charging the insured for this difference is known as
balance billing.2 This article will examine ways that courts have dealt with
disputes regarding "usual and customary" charges and explore ways that
courts can help to make the determination more predictable for all of the
interested parties-including the insured, the insurers, and the healthcare
providers.
The difficulty in determining what is a "usual and customary" rate not
only affects those whose insurance policies are limited to such coverage, but
even those who have insurance which protects them from balance billing to
the extent that this uncertainty is a contributing factor to the high premiums
of their policies. State legislatures have in many cases left it to the courts to
determine what the "usual and customary" rates for necessary medical ser-
vices are, and this has inevitably led to litigation between insurers and pro-
viders. To resolve both the issue of balance-billing and inevitable disputes
between providers and insurers, courts should establish a presumptive rate
based on a measurable standard to ensure that patients, providers, and insur-
ers all have reasonable expectations of what rates should be.
Part I of this article provides background information with regard to
the types of situations where "usual, customary, and reasonable" charges
remain uncertain. Part 1I explores the reasons courts have had difficulty in
construing the meaning of "usual, and customary charges." Part IV discusses
government insurance programs that limit reimbursement to maximum fee
schedules as a potential reference point for courts in other contexts. Part V
analyzes how courts have dealt with the uncertainty through a review of ap-
pellate cases. Finally, the article proposes that courts, unless prohibited by
other statutory mandates, should recognize presumptively reasonable rates
1. See Bob LaMendola, Law Might Let Some Bills Rise-Billing Practice Leaves Pa-
tients in PPO Plans to Pay Extra Charges; SUN-SENTINEL, July 7, 2009, at Dl.
2. Andrea M. Maestas, Note, Balance Billing: The Ban on Unfair Billing Practices
Increases Tension Between Cost Control and Quality Care, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 393, 393
(2009).
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ideally based on a government-run database, or alternatively based on Medi-
care rates.
II. BACKGROUND
There are several different contexts in which a dispute is likely to arise
over the amount due for healthcare services that a provider has rendered.
The first situation is in the context of private health insurance where the in-
surer and provider have not pre-negotiated a rate in advance of treatment.
The second circumstance arises where an individual seeks medical attention
following an automobile accident and the automobile insurer is responsible
to pay for a portion of the services that have been rendered. Another cir-
cumstance is where an uninsured person seeks medical treatment.
A. Private Insurance
Over half the country is covered by private health insurance.' The ma-
jority of these people are covered by either a health maintenance organiza-
tion or a preferred provider organization.4 This article will limit its analysis
of usual and customary charges to these two types of health insurance prod-
ucts.
1. Health Maintenance Organizations
A health maintenance organization (HMO) is a type of managed care
insurance where the insured is limited to a closed network of doctors.'
Usually, the insured must have a primary care physician and usually must
obtain a referral from that physician prior to seeing a specialist or seeking
non-emergency care in a hospital.6 The HMO usually has contractual dis-
counts with all of its network providers.7 An HMO member will not be
reimbursed for seeking treatment outside the network of doctors or if he or
3. Managed Care National Statistics, MCOL,
http://www.mcareol.com/factshts/factnati.htm (last visited January 5, 2011).
4. Id.
5. See BARRY R. FuRRow Er AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 564
(6th ed. 2008).
6. Carol K. Lucas & Michelle A. Williams, The Rights of Nonparticipating Providers in
a Managed Care World: Navigating the Minefields of Balance Billing and Reasonable and
Customary Payments, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 132, 135 (2009).
7. See id.
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she does not follow the procedural requirements.8 There are two instances
where a member may have no choice but to go out of network. The first is
when the insured goes to a non-network facility in an emergency---or is
brought to such a facility if unconscious or severely injured at the time.9 The
second is when the insured has gone to a network facility, but a hospital-
based physician-such as an emergency room doctor, an anesthesiologist,
pathologist, or radiologist-who treats the insured is not part of the HMO
network.' ° Many states have either express statutory restrictions on balance
billing HMO members or have determined that it is unlawful to do so
through judicial construction of a state's statutes." Although the HMO
member is protected, the issue of usual and customary charges still exists as
the provider and insurer must settle between them what the insured should
reimburse the provider for the treatment. 2
2. Preferred Provider Organizations
A preferred provider organization (PPO) is a type of managed care that
also consists of a network of contracted providers, similar to an HMO. '3 The
insurance company will have usually contracted significant discounted rates
with the providers in its network. 14 The insurance contract, however, will
usually not require any referrals to see specialists or for extensive proce-
dures. 5 Furthermore, the plan will often cover the insured even if he or she
chooses to visit an out-of-network provider-that is, one that has not con-
8. JACK HOADLEY, ET AL., CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., UNEXPECTED CHARGES: WHAT
STATES ARE DOING ABOUT BALANCE BILLING 5 (2009).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 4-5 ("While radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists are hospital-
based physicians, they are almost never hospital employees and may or may not contract with
the same [insurers] as the hospital."); see, e.g., Joseph L. Riley Anesthesia Assocs. v. Stein, 27
So. 3d 140, 141-42 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a hospital-based, but non-
contracted, anesthesiologist could not balance bill HMO subscribers where the hospital had a
contract with the insurer).
11. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 641.3154(4) (2010); MD. CODE ANN., Health-General § 19-
701(i), (p) (West 2010); Prospect Med. Grp., Inc. v. Northridge Emergency Med. Grp., 198
P.3d 86, 88-89 (Cal. 2009). According to a 2006 survey by the American Health Lawyers
Association, nine states have laws that prohibit non-network providers from balance billing
HMO members. HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 6.
12. See, e.g., Peter F. Merkle, M.D., P.A. v. Health Options, Inc., 940 So. 2d 1190, 1193-
94 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
13. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 564.
14. See id.
15. See Lucas & Williams, supra note 6, at 135.
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tracted with the insurance company. 16 A plan may try to discourage mem-
bers from visiting out-of-network providers by imposing higher out-of-
pocket costs-via higher deductibles, copays, and out-of-pocket maximums
or a combination thereof. 7 The insurer will often also limit the amount that
it will reimburse out-of-network providers to what the insurer deems to be
the usual and customary charge for that service in a specific geographic
area.' The insured and the provider often are unaware of how this maximum
fee is calculated by the insurance company.' 9 Where the insured has kno-
wingly selected an out-of-network provider, the insured will have the oppor-
tunity to work with his or her insurance company to determine the reim-
bursement rate and to negotiate a rate with the out-of-network provider.2°
The insured has no choice, however, when he or she goes to an out-of-
network facility in an emergency situation, or where the insured goes to an
in-network facility but is seen by a hospital-based physician who has not
contracted with the insurer.2' The hospital-based physicians, such as emer-
gency room doctors, anesthesiologists, pathologists, radiologists, and on-call
specialists are often not hospital employees and will bill separately for their
services.22 During his or her hospital stay, the insured has no choice as to
which doctors will see him or her and may not learn until months after leav-
ing the hospital that such providers were not part of his or her insurance net-
work.23 As such, not only will he or she be surprised at the higher out-of-
pocket responsibility, but may also be shocked to learn that the provider is
also asking for the difference between what the insurance company called
usual and customary and what the provider claims to be his or her usual
charge.
B. Personal Injury Protection
States that have no-fault automobile insurance may require automobile
drivers to carry Personal Injury Protection (PIP) to cover some portion of the
16. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 564.
17. See id.
18. OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP.,
UNDERPAYMENTS TO CONSUMERS BY THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 2-3 (June 24, 2009),
available at
http://publish.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/PPMC09/quackenbos
_exhA.pdf [hereinafter UNDERPAYMENTS TO CONSUMERS].
19. See id. at 4-5.
20. See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 13.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 5.
23. See LaMendola, supra note 1.
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medical fees for the driver and his or her passengers resulting from an auto-
mobile accident regardless of fault.24 As automobile insurers are often not
primarily health insurance companies, they may not have the resources to
pre-negotiate rates with a significant number of providers in their coverage
area. State legislatures, in their attempt to ensure that automobile insurance
rates are affordable, will often specify the maximum fees that providers can
charge when treating patients covered under the PIP schedule of an automo-
bile insurance policy.25 PIP statutory schemes without fixed schedules have
produced litigation between automobile insurers and providers.26 In New
Jersey, for example, the statutory scheme required that a government agency
establish the 75th percentile of usual and customary charges.27 Originally,
the agency only established such fees for a small number of services. 28 This
led to extensive litigation and, according to the New Jersey Department of
Banking and Insurance (Department), higher automobile insurance fees.29
To resolve this uncertainty, the Department then established a fee schedule
based on what it deemed to meet the statutory requirements for more than
one thousand services.3" Many providers challenged the Department's fee
schedule claiming that the schedules did not represent the statutory required
fees.3' The state appellate court, however, upheld the department's fee sche-
dule.32
C. Uninsured
Another situation where a person seeks treatment without a pre-
negotiated contractual fee with the provider is where a person does not have
health insurance-that is, the person is uninsured.33 State protection for the
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 (West 2010).
25. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins., H.B. 13C (2007) Staff Analysis 10-11 (Oct. 4, 2007) [he-
reinafter H.B. 13C Staff Analysis].
26. See Law Offices of Thomas J. Mallon, 2007 PIP Fee Schedule Finally Approved by
New Jersey Court, FINDLAW (Nov. 23, 2009),
http://knowledgebase.findlaw.com/kb/2009/Nov/32403.html.
27. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.6(a). The statute actually requires the fees to represent
"the reasonable and prevailing fees of 75% of the practitioners within the region." Id.
28. Law Offices of Thomas J. Mallon, supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, 979 A.2d 770, 774 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009).
32. Id.
33. If the estimates by the Congressional Budget Office prove accurate, the number of
uninsured Americans will drop from approximately 50 million today to about 23 million by
2019 as a result of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. See Letter from Douglas
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uninsured varies. 4 Some states will require that the patient only pay a rea-
sonable fee for the services.35 Other states will allow hospitals and physi-
cians to bill the rates they list as their standard prices-lists which are some-
times referred to as "charge masters"--even if few people ever pay these
actual rates and even if the lists contain tens of thousands of items. 36 Court
decisions in states where the uninsured are only responsible for a reasonable
fee could provide guidance with regard to usual and customary or market
rates. Courts, however, might distinguish reasonable rates from customary
rates on the theory that the highest contract rate might be reasonable even if
it is not the usual and customary rate for that service.37
III. USUAL, CUSTOMARY, AND REASONABLE (UCR) CHARGES
Legislatures have left it to the courts to determine what the "usual, cus-
tomary, and reasonable" rate for medical services are in particular circums-
tances. This might be because, traditionally, plaintiffs and defendants have
come to courts for a factual determination on matters such as how much to
award an injured plaintiff in a negligence case, what the fair market value of
a closely held corporation is, or what is a reasonable fee for an attorney or
other fiduciary. Nevertheless, a factual determination of the "usual and cus-
tomary" charge in the context of medical services is distinct from these other
situations and courts have not been able to effectively resolve these differ-
ences. 38 In making a determination as to what is a usual and customary med-
W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives 7 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/docl1355/hr4872.pdf. Furthermore, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act also contains provisions which would require charitable hospitals to
charge certain uninsured patients the same amount they generally bill those with insurance.
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Thus, uninsured parties may involve
the courts less often in disputes over charges as a result of this recent healthcare reform.
34. See David Stahl, Note, The Role of The Florida Courts in Protecting the Uninsured
from Being Overcharged for Emergency Medical Services, 33 NOVA L. REV. 269, 271-74
(2008).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 521, 526 n.10 (5th Cir. 2007)
(noting that calculating a "reasonable rate" based on the median price paid by private insurers
would mean that "approximately half of the insurers would have negotiated an 'unreasonable'
rate").
38. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts,
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 647-48 (2008). But see id. at 684
("Certainly, determining reasonableness is well within judicial experience and competence.
Valuation is a pervasive judicial function; tort and contract cases routinely present damage
issues quite as challenging.").
2010]
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ical charge, a court faces at least two initial challenges. First, in light of the
modem reality of medical billing, the courts must construe the meaning of a
word like "charges" to determine if this refers to the amount the provider
bills for services in the absence of any contract, or the amount that the pro-
vider accepts as full payment.39 Next, assuming a court accepts that
"charges" refers to the payments that providers accept as full payment, a
court must still determine how to calculate what these "usual and customary"
amounts actually are.40
A. What Is a "Charge"?
Before determining what "usual and customary charges" are, a court
must first construe the meaning of the word "charges.' Medical providers
may argue that the word "charges" means a provider's standard charges be-
fore applying any contractual discounts. The providers argue this based on
the use of the word "charges" rather than "amounts accepted." When inter-
preting statutory language regarding compensation for healthcare services,
several courts have looked at the legislative intent and determined that "usual
and customary" language is generally used to ensure that the insurers are
required to compensate the providers at fair market prices for their services.42
The fair market value reflects the legislative intent to balance the desire to
provide fair compensation to the providers so that qualified people will
choose to become healthcare providers with the need to keep insurance costs
affordable.43 As such, the fair market value would be based on what the pro-
viders have agreed to accept as full payment." Whether the value should
include only private contracted amounts or should also include payment from
all sources is another issue courts must resolve.
39. See, e.g., Baker Cnty. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., L.L.C., 31 So. 3d
842, 844 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
40. See, e.g., id. at 844-45.
41. Id. at 845.
42. See Baker Cnty. Med. Servs., 31 So. 3d at 845; In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29,
979 A.2d at 789. But see Holland v. Trinity Health Care Corp., No. 280657, 2010 WL
933975, at 2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2010) (finding that an agreement between an uninsured
patient and a hospital where the uninsured agreed to pay the hospital's "usual and customary
charges" referred to the hospital's list prices because Black's Law Dictionary defines charge
as "to demand a fee; to bill").
43. See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C., 11:3-29, 979 A.2d at 789 (noting that the purpose of
the statute in question was to contain "insurance costs 'while providing a fair level of reim-
bursement for services based on what providers received in the market"' (quoting Coal. for
Quality Health Care v. N.J. Dep't of Banking & Ins., 817 A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2003))).
44. See id. (citing Coal. for Quality Health Care, 817 A.2d at 350).
[Vol. 35
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The recently enacted federal healthcare legislation, the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act (Act), could offer some support for the propo-
sition that "charges" should refer to the discounted amounts.45 Under the
Act, to maintain their tax exempt status, charitable hospitals must implement
certain charge policies with respect to financial assistance for uninsured pa-
tients. 46 The Act prohibits the use of "gross charges," and as originally writ-
ten, required the charitable hospitals to charge no more than "the lowest
amounts charged to individuals who have insurance covering such care.
' ' 7
The implication from this language is that when unmodified, a "charge" is
the amount that a patient or insurer is ultimately responsible to pay. In the
Act, the legislature adds modifiers such as "gross" or "standard" when refer-
ring to the non-discounted charges.48
B. What Is "Usual and Customary"?
If a court has construed "charges" to mean the amounts that providers in
the community are willing to accept as full payment for similar services, the
court still faces a daunting task of determining what those rates actually are.
This section discusses why the rates are difficult to determine, analyzes the
problems that the private market has had in making reliable data publicly
available, and explores the possibility of a government sponsored database of
fee information.
1. "Veil of Secrecy '
49
The difficulty in determining the actual prices paid for medical services
in the United States is twofold. First, most contracts between insurers and
45. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a), 124
Stat. 119, 857 (2010).
46. See id. § 9007(a), (c), 124 Stat. at 855, 857.
47. See id. § 9007(a), 124 Stat. at 857. Section 10903 changes the language from "lowest
amounts charged" to "amounts generally billed." See id. at § 10903(a), 124 Stat. at 1016. The
logical implication of this change is that the legislature considers the amount charged (as well
as the amount billed) to be the discounted amount and not the full list price which the legisla-
ture refers to as "gross charges" in the next paragraph. The use of the modifier "to individuals
who have insurance covering such care" indicates that Congress recognized that those with
and those without insurance are billed/charged different amounts. The use of "gross charges"
also shows that Congress recognizes that hospitals have a policy of setting list prices that do
not represent the amount that most pay.
48. See Public Health Service Act § 2718(c) (as amended by Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act § 1001).
49. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil
of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFFAtrs 57 (2006).
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providers contain confidentiality agreements that prevent either the insurer or
the provider from disclosing the information to third parties.5° One scholar
refers to this lack of transparency as a "veil that has been draped for so long
over the actual prices paid in the U.S. health system."'" Second, there is no
standard billing practice for all providers, so it is difficult to compare charges
from different providers.52
Even without contractual confidentiality agreements, antitrust concerns
would also play a part in making such data difficult to obtain. For example,
the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have
warned that disclosure of a provider's fees which may become available to
competing providers could violate federal antitrust laws.53 The federal au-
thorities have issued guidelines to medical providers regarding the type of
fee information they can safely disclose to third party data collectors without
violating any of the federal antitrust regulations.-4 These guidelines require
that all disclosures be made to third parties-that is, not directly to any com-
peting providers-the disclosed data must be at least three months old if it
may become available to competitors, and "the information must be collected
from enough sources so that no individual provider's price may be identi-
fied."55
The antitrust concerns create a tension because they may preclude an
insurance company involved in litigation from producing, pursuant to a dis-
covery request, documents that include detailed information about contrac-
tual relationships with competing providers in the area. While the insurer
could provide data that would meet the federal antitrust guidelines-by in-
cluding only data that is at least three months old and by removing any in-
formation regarding individual provider's prices-the provider would likely
object to its reliability on three grounds. First, the provider would not be
able to investigate the calculations in detail. Second, the data would be at
least three months old. Finally, the data would only be collected from one
insurer and therefore would not be reflective of the entire marketplace.
50. See id. at 61-62.
51. Id. at 62.
52. See id. at 59, 62-63.
53. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECON. & BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF, INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN
THE PRICING OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PHARMACEUTICALS 7 (2008), [hereinafter
INCREASING TRANSPARENCY] available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/92xx/doc9284/06-05-
PriceTransparency.pdf.
54. See id.
55. Id.
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2. Problems with Private Databases
One potential solution to the difficulty in determining the "usual and
customary" amounts paid for medical services would be for a third-party to
maintain a reliable database which could be used by the industry to deter-
mine how rates compare. For many years, the medical insurance industry
relied on databases provided by Ingenix, Inc. for such information.56 The
industry primarily used this database to establish the amount the insurers
were willing to pay out-of-network providers based on the insurers' contrac-
tual obligations with their customers to pay a usual and customary amount.
The Ingenix database was maintained by a wholly owned subsidiary of Un-
itedHealth Group, Inc. (UnitedHealth), one of the largest health insurers in
the United States.58
Although the Ingenix database was used by insurers to calculate the
usual, customary, and reasonable rate that they were willing to reimburse
out-of-network providers in PPOs, its reliability often did not hold up in
court. For example, one federal district judge, in ruling that a class settle-
ment agreement between a health insurance company and its subscribers was
fair, reported that there were "serious flaws" in the way the Ingenix data was
collected and processed.59 Similarly, a Massachusetts appellate court found
that the database could not be introduced as evidence in a dispute between an
automobile insurer and a chiropractor over a "reasonable fee" because the
data lacked the "requisite indicia of reliability to be admissible."'  Further-
more, a New Jersey appellate court stayed a state agency's ruling that al-
lowed insurers to use the Ingenix database to determine reasonable and pre-
vailing fees for services which the agency had not established fee sche-
dules. 61 The court criticized the agency for not having investigated fully
whether the database was reliable.62
The use of the Ingenix database to determine usual and customary rates
ended after a settlement between UnitedHealth and the New York Attorney
56. UNDERPAYMENTS TO CONSUMERS, supra note 18, at 4. In testimony before a Senate
Committee, a healthcare executive said, "We know of no alternative sources of national health
care charge databases." Id. (citing Letter from William Marino, President and CEO, Horizon
Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., to Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (Apr. 23, 2009)).
57. Id. at 7-8.
58. Id. at 3.
59. McCoy v. Health Net, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 448,464-65 (D.N.J. 2008).
60. Michael Davekos, P.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 Mass. App. Div. 32 (Mass.
App. Div. 2008).
61. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, 979 A.2d 770, 792 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009).
62. Id. at 790.
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General.63 In February 2008, the New York Attorney General announced
that his office was conducting "'an industry-wide investigation into a scheme
by health insurers to defraud consumers by manipulating reimbursement
rates. ' '64 Based on this investigation, the New York Attorney General filed a
lawsuit against UnitedHealth and its subsidiaries alleging that due to a con-
flict of interest, Ingenix was intentionally reporting fees below the true mar-
ket values.65 This was done because other UnitedHealth subsidiaries were
using the data to determine their own liability for reimbursement to out-of-
network providers.66 UnitedHealth eventually settled with the State by
agreeing to close the Ingenix database, to contribute $50 million for the crea-
tion of a nonprofit organization to run a new database, and to transfer its ex-
isting data to the new organization.67 The New York Attorney General also
entered into settlement agreements with other insurance companies where
they also agreed to contribute to the creation of this independent nonprofit
organization.68
The creation of the independent nonprofit organization to maintain a da-
tabase of paid medical claims is promising; however, this organization will
likely face some of the same challenges Ingenix experienced as described in
a United State Senate Commerce Committee report.69 One main problem
that the Senate report found was that the insurance companies that would
eventually use the same data to determine their own liability were responsi-
ble for reporting their own unaudited claims data.7° As such, these insurers
would "scrub" the data before submitting it to Ingenix by excluding high
payouts. 7' The insurers would also average some claims together which
would distort the method used of finding modal data-such as a price at
which 75% of providers charge less.72  Another criticism by the Senate
63. See Press Release, N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Att'y Gen. Announces Expansion of His-
toric Health Ins. Reform: Aetna Will End Relationship with Company That Manipulated
Rates to Overcharge Patients by Hundreds of Millions of Dollars (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2009/jan/janl5a_09.html [hereinafter N.Y. State
Att'y Gen. Press Release].
64. Lucas & Williams, supra note 6, at 156 (quoting New York Attorney General Cuo-
mo).
65. Id. at 156-57.
66. Id. at 158-59.
67. N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Press Release, supra note 72.
68. See Lucas & Williams, supra note 6, at 161.
69. See UNDERPAYMENTS TO CONSUMERS, supra note 18, at i-ii.
70. See id. at 8-9.
71. Id. at 17-18.
72. See id. at 17.
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Commerce Committee was that the Ingenix database did not provide transpa-
rency to consumers and medical providers.73
3. A New Hope?
In addition to the New York settlement agreement, there is another hope
for the compilation of transparent data with regard to the payment of claims.
Section 10101 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Act)
amends section 2794 of the Public Health Service Act and provides funding
for the creation of "Medical Reimbursement Data Centers. '74 A data center
created under this provision must, among other things, "develop fee sche-
dules and other database tools that fairly and accurately reflect market rates
for medical services and the geographic differences in those rates."'75 Also,
the centers must "make health care cost information readily available to the
public through an Internet website that allows consumers to understand the
amounts that health care providers in their area charge for particular medical
services. 76 Furthermore, the Act entitles qualifying states to receive be-
tween $1 million and $5 million a year for up to five years for creating these
centers. 77 The amendment to the original bill seems to correspond with many
of the findings of the earlier Senate Commerce Committee report. Only time
will tell if states will take advantage of this potential federal grant and
whether such data can be implemented to make the elusive "market rates for
medical services" easier to determine.
IV. POTENTIAL SOURCES FOR ESTABLISHING REASONABLE CHARGES
In the absence of hard data on the customary rates that providers are ac-
tually "charging," courts could look to government established fee schedules
such as those used by Medicare and state worker's compensation statutes for
guidance on prevailing rates.
73. See id. at 14-16.
74. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10101(i), 124
Stat. 119, 891 (2010).
75. Public Health Service Act, § 2794(d)(1)(A) (as amended by Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act § 10101(i)).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 1003, 124 Stat. at 140.
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A. Medicare Fee Schedules
Medicare is a federal health insurance program administered by the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and primarily covers
people who are at least sixty-five years old.78 The government pays physi-
cians who treat Medicare members based on fee schedules and federal law
generally prevents the providers from balance-billing Medicare members.79
Although Medicare participants do not need protection from balance-billing
and their premiums are unaffected by the determination of usual and custo-
mary fees, understanding how Medicare fees are determined is important in
analyzing whether courts should consider these fees when trying to ascertain
the usual and customary charge for a medical procedure.
When Medicare was first started in 1965, the government needed to en-
courage medical providers to accept patients covered by the program.80 Ac-
cordingly, Medicare initially reimbursed doctors the same way that private
insurers were reimbursing them at the time.8' This was based on the prevail-
ing amount that doctors in a geographic area actually billed.82 Where the
Medicare rate was less than a physician's full charges, the doctors could bill
beneficiaries for the balance.83 This led to a rapid rise in the providers'
charges as Medicare reimbursements would increase with any rise in prices.'
As a result, starting in 1975, the federal government would only increase
Medicare reimbursements for fee increases that did not exceed the increase
in the Medicare economic index.85
Because these changes were not enough to stop total payments from ris-
ing more rapidly than Congress anticipated, in 1992, Congress implemented
a new payment system that was based on a fee schedule rather than on physi-
78. H.B. 13C Staff Analysis, supra note 25, at 8. The program also covers some disabled
people under sixty-five and people with End-Stage Renal Disease ("permanent kidney failure
treated with dialysis or a transplant"). Id.
79. See id. at 9, 12; HOADLEY, ET AL., supra note 8, at 17.
80. See Medicare's Physician Fee Schedule: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Health, 3 (May 5, 2004) (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Dir., Congressional Budget Of-
fice) [hereinafter Medicare's Physician Fee Schedule].
81. Id.
82. See HOADLEY, et al., supra note 8, at 10.
83. Medicare's Physician Fee Schedule, supra note 80, at 3.
84. See id.
85. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECON. & BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF, THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
RATE FORMULA FOR SETTING MEDICARE'S PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES 1 (2006), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs75xx/doc7542/09-07-SGR-brief.pdf [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH RATE FORMULA]. The Medicare economic index measured both changes in the cost
of a physician's time (i.e. inflation) and discounted for expected improvements in productivi-
ty. See id. at I n.1.
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cians' actual charges.8 6 This fee schedule calculated fees based on the rela-
tive resources required for each service.87 This scale currently includes fac-
tors that consider the amount of training and time required by the physician
to perform the work, the physician's practice expenses, and the physician's
professional liability insurance.88 This scaled value is then multiplied by a
geographic factor and a monetary conversion factor to arrive at a fee for a
particular service.89 Although the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) is ultimately responsible for setting and reviewing the factors
used for every service, CMS relies on input from the American Medical As-
sociation and national medical specialty societies.90 The monetary conver-
sion factors were originally established such that the total reimbursement to
all physicians, after converting to the fee schedule, would be the same as
when the fees were based on usual and customary charges. 9' As a result, in
1991, the allowed reimbursement for a particular service based on the fee
schedule did not necessarily correlate with the usual and customary charge
for that same service, but over the years, the use of this formula by Medicare
and other private insurers is likely to have influenced the usual and customa-
ry charges in general.92
B. Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation insurance statutes may also provide guidance to
courts as to what constitutes a usual and customary rate for medical services
in the absence of a contract. State law will often require employers to carry
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id.
88. Overview of the RBRVS, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-
insurance/medicare/the-resource-based-relative-value-scale/overview-of-rbrvs.shtml (last
visited Nov. 14, 2010). The professional liability insurance factor was added in 2000. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE FORMULA, supra note 85, at 1. The federal government
has made several changes since implementing this fee schedule in order to keep overall ex-
penditures within the projected budget. Id. Originally, this was to be done by basing the
conversion value for particular services on the total volume of those services used. Id. at 1-2.
This method, however, required using volumes from past years and did not restrain the overall
costs as expected. Id. at 2. Thus, in 1998, Congress shifted to a Sustainable Growth Rate
model. Id. The current impact of this switch is that physician payouts are scheduled to be
reduced by more than 20% in the next few years. SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE FORMULA,
supra note 85, at 2. If this reduction goes into effect, then the proposed relationship between
Medicare fees and usual and customary charges will be distorted. See id.
92. See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 10.
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insurance to fully compensate workers for work related injuries-including
medical costs. 9 3 The intent is to get the worker back to being productive as
soon as possible "at a reasonable cost to the employer."94 An injured em-
ployee may choose a provider whose standard rate is much higher than what
other providers in the area charge. Typically, in cases involving workers'
compensation, the provider and the insurer do not have a pre-negotiated con-
tract on fees.95 To ensure that workers' compensation insurance remains
affordable, many legislatures have adopted maximum fee schedules that pro-
viders can charge when treating patients for work related injuries that are
covered by workers' compensation insurance.96 Except where fee schedules
continue to be based on reasonable and customary charges, the providers and
insurers should also be able to determine the maximum fee without litigation.
Courts could use the workers' compensation fee schedules as evidence of
market value because under most circumstances providers do not have to
take workers' compensation patients unless they choose to do so, and be-
cause such patients are not likely to be such a huge portion of a practice that
it would be commercially impracticable for a provider to refuse to partici-
pate.97 Thus, provider's acceptance of the worker's compensation rates sug-
gests that the compensation they receive represents a fair market value.
V. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF UCR
Analyzing how courts have dealt with determining the usual, customa-
ry, and reasonable charges where there is no contract between the payor and
the service provider helps to understand where the courts are and where they
should be headed.
A. Lessons from Temple
In Temple University Hospital, Inc. v. Healthcare Management Alterna-
tives, Inc.,98 a Pennsylvania appellate court held that the "reasonable value"
for a hospital's services should be determined based on the value actually
paid by the relevant community." Temple involved a dispute between a Me-
93. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.09(1) (2010).
94. Id. § 440.015 (2010).
95. See H.B. 13C Staff Analysis, supra note 25, at 10; Lucas & Williams, supra note 6,
at 138.
96. H.B. 13C Staff Analysis, supra note 25, at 9-12.
97. Hall & Schneider, supra note 38, at 660-63.
98. 832 A.2d 501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
99. Id. at 510.
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dicaid HMO and a hospital after a contract between the two expired." The
hospital had told the insurer that it would not enter into a new contract at the
old rates.1 ' As the hospital was required to take emergency room patients
and the insurer, as a Medicaid HMO, could not prevent its subscribers from
visiting any particular hospital, the hospital continued treating the HMO
members for a four year period while trying to negotiate with the insurer.
1 12
During much of that time, the hospital billed at its published rates, but the
HMO only paid what it deemed its standard rate-a rate that was lower than
the original contract amount between the two parties.0 3 The trial court even-
tually found that the HMO had to pay the hospital the reasonable value for its
services under a quasi-contract theory.U°4 The trial court determined that the
"reasonable value" was the hospital's published rate as long as the court was
"not shocked by the amount."1 5 The appellate court reversed, holding that
the "reasonable value" should be the average charge the hospital received
based on its contracts with governmental agencies and private insurance
companies.'" The court reasoned that for the hospital to recover anymore
than its average compensation would amount to a windfall for the hospital.'0 7
B. New Jersey PIP Case
Section 39:6A-4.6 of the New Jersey Statutes requires the Department
of Banking and Insurance (the Department) to establish medical fee sche-
dules for medical expenses paid by automobile insurers pursuant to no-fault
personal injury protection.108 The statute requires that the fee schedule "shall
incorporate the reasonable and prevailing fees of 75% of the practitioners
within the region."'0 9 Originally, the Department had established a fee sche-
100. Id. at 505.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 509.
103. Temple Univ. Hosp., 832 A.2d at 505.
104. Id. at 506.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 509-10.
107. See id. at 509. The persuasiveness of this quasi-contract reasonableness argument in
cases where the insurer is required to pay a "usual and customary charge" is not clear. Even if
"usual and customary" charges are based on payments received, the "usual and customary"
charge could be much higher than the average payment which the court proposed in this case.
For example, if the provider's paid fee was $100 for just more than half of the patients he or
she saw and $50 in the rest of the case, then the "average" charge would be $75, even though
the provider never charged that amount.
108. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.6(a) (West 2010).
109. Id. Although the statute referred to "reasonable and prevailing fees," the agency also
used the term "usual, customary, and reasonable" fee in determining how parties are to deter-
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dule which was based on the amounts that providers had actually billed." °
After years of using a formula based on billed fees, the Department, in De-
cember 2000, proposed changing its fee schedule to reflect the realities of
medical billing in the state."' The Department noted that in the nine-years
since the fee schedules had been in effect, there had been "an increasing dif-
ference between fees billed by health care providers and the fees actually
accepted by them as payment for services rendered."'" 2 As a result, the ma-
jority of payments accepted were below the seventy-fifth percentile of billed
fees.' '3 Because the purpose of the statute was to contain costs for automo-
bile insurance while ensuring a fair level of compensation for services pro-
vided, the Department proposed setting its schedule based on the paid fees
accepted by 75% of the providers.'
The Department eventually calculated a revised fee schedule by collect-
ing data of all medical fees actually paid for medical care under PIP
claims. 115 The Department noticed a high correlation between the seventy-
fifth percentile of the fees actually paid and 130% of the Medicare reim-
bursement rate." 6 Because the Department found the Medicare participating
provider fee schedule to be both "comprehensive" and "resource based," the
Department decided that for most of the services for which it was providing a
fee schedule, the 130% of the Medicare participating provider fee reflected
the reasonable and prevailing fees of 75% of the practitioners in the area." 7
For services where the Department found that the rate from the collected data
was much higher than the rate based on Medicare, the Department calculated
the seventy-fifth percentile of the fees actually paid based on the collected
data."
8
mine fees for services not in the schedule. See McCoy v. Health Net, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d
448, 450-51 (D.N.J. 2008). The New Jersey appellate court, in upholding the agencies fee
schedule, distinguished a previous federal case based on New Jersey law where the contrac-
tual language had been "charges" rather than fees. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, 979
A.2d 770, 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). In McCoy v. Health Net Inc., the federal
district court had determined that the insurer had breached its contract with providers when it
started paying them the usual and customary payments they received rather than the usual and
customary amounts they billed. McCoy, 569 F. Supp. at 464-65. The court emphasized that
the contract had used the word "charge" rather than "fee." Id. at 464-68.
110. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, 979 A.2d at 775-76.
111. Id. at776.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. In reAdoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, 979 A.2d at 778.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 777.
118. Id. at 778.
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Several coalitions of healthcare providers challenged the fee schedule as
violating the statutory requirement that the fee schedule represents "the rea-
sonable and prevailing fees of 75%."'"'9 They argued that the statute required
the Department to look at the billed fees rather than the paid fees and that the
use of a multiplier of the Medicare participating provider fee schedule did
not reflect the "reasonable and prevailing fees of 75% of the practitioners
within the region., 120  Although a New Jersey appellate court initially
granted a stay preventing the implementation of the new fee schedule, the
appellate court eventually ruled that "the rules, regulations and fee schedule"
were valid. 12 In coming to its conclusion, the court noted that the Depart-
ment's reliance on the Medicare data was based on two factors.12 2 The first
factor was the close correlation with data that it had already collected.22 The
other factor was that the Department had analyzed how the Medicare fees
were determined. 24 The court acknowledged that the Department had de-
scribed in detail the methodology used to determine Medicare rates. 25 Fur-
ther, the court noted that the Department had considered that the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services used input from the provider community in
determining the relative value units for the physician's work, practice ex-
penses and malpractice premium expenses.
12 6
Perhaps the aspect of this case which provides the most helpful guid-
ance with respect to resolving what constitutes a charge or fee in the context
of medical services is the court's rationale for rejecting the appellants' claim
that the Department violated the statute's requirements by using "billed fees"
rather than "paid fees." First, the court pointed out "that the purpose of the
[PIP] statute was to contain automobile insurance costs 'while providing a
fair level of reimbursement for services based on what providers received in
the market.""' 27 Next, the court, citing its earlier precedent, noted that "paid
fees have diverged significantly from billed fees, making paid fees a much
more accurate measure of 'reasonable and prevailing fees."",128 The findings
of this case should not be limited to Personal Injury Protections. Courts that
119. Id. at 773.
120. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, 979 A.2d at 773 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. §
39:6A-4.6 (West 2002)).
121. Id. at 774.
122. See id. at 785-86.
123. Id. at 786.
124. See id. at 785-86.
125. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 11:3-29, 979 A.2d at 785-86.
126. See id. at 785.
127. Id. (quoting Coal. for Quality Health Care v. N.J. Dep't of Banking and Ins., 817
A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)).
128. Id. (quoting Coal. for Quality Health Care, 817 A.2d at 350).
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are making factual findings with regard to "usual and customary" charges,
whether the court is construing a statute or a contract, should acknowledge
this divergence between "paid fees" and "billed fees" and try to find the
"usual and customary" value based on "paid fees."
C. Florida HMO Cases
This section examines how Florida courts have dealt with disputes be-
tween health insurance providers and out-of-network providers over reason-
able charges in the absence of a pre-existing contract.
One situation where the courts have had to determine the proper com-
pensation for medical services in the absence of a contract is where HMO
subscribers have used non-contracting providers for emergency services and
care. 29 In Florida, HMO contracts must include coverage for emergency
care and services. 3 ' The HMO is not permitted to deny coverage for such
care even if the provider that has treated the subscriber does not have a con-
tract with the insurer .31 Section 641.513 of the Florida Statutes also dic-
tates how the HMO must compensate the provider of emergency services.
32
In such a case, the HMO must reimburse the medical provider the lesser of:
(a) The provider's charges;
(b) The usual and customary provider charges for similar servic-
es in the community where the services were provided; or
(c) The charge mutually agreed to by the health maintenance or-
ganization and the provider within 60 days of the submittal of the
claim.'
33
If the HMO pays the amount the provider initially bills or if the HMO and
the provider come to a mutual agreement, there are no issues. Where the
parties cannot agree on what the reimbursement should be, providers 34 have
129. See, e.g., Baker Cnty. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., LLC, 31 So. 3d 842
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
130. FLA. STAT. §§ 641.31(12), .513(3) (2010).
131. See id. § 641.513(5).
132. Id.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. The insurers have no reason to seek redress because the provider, as required by law,
has already performed the services. An insurer could seek a declaratory judgment in court of
law, but there would be little reason for doing so.
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two options: they can file lawsuits to resolve the disputes,'35 or they can seek
voluntary alternate dispute resolution processes.'36 The alternate dispute
resolution process, however, is nonbinding.'37 As such, the process is not
well-suited for resolving the legal question of how to calculate "usual and
customary provider charges."'
138
Although section 641.513 of the Florida Statutes does not specifically
indicate that a provider has a private cause of action, Florida courts have
determined that providers can sue to establish the appropriate reimbursement
under the statutory scheme. 139 Until recently, the Florida appellate decisions
had not provided much guidance, however, as to how to calculate the "usual
and customary provider charges for similar services." For example, in Peter
F. Merkle, M.D., P.A. v. Health Options, Inc.,"4 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal provided that the statute requires "HMOs to reimburse non-
participating providers according to the statute's dictates, not based on Medi-
care reimbursement rates.'' In that case, the insurer had a policy of reim-
bursing non-participating providers at 120% of the Medicare reimbursement
rate. 42 The court, however, was ruling on a motion to dismiss based on the
defendant's claim that the statute required the providers to use the alternate
dispute resolution process, and, therefore, never provided binding guidance
on how a finder of fact should calculate the "usual and customary provider
charges."'143 The court noted that the insurer was not following the statute's
requirement to compensate based on the "usual and customary provider
charges" where the insurer was adhering to a strict formula based on a mul-
135. See Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 934 So. 2d 602,
604 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
136. See FLA. STAT. § 408.7057(2)(a); Baycare Health Sys., Inc. v. Agency for Healthcare
Admin., 940 So. 2d 563, 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
137. Baycare Health Sys., Inc., 940 So. 2d at 568 n.5.
138. See id. at 568 ('This case demonstrates that the process created by section 408.7057
is not an adequate method to resolve legal issues of first impression that involve the payment
of millions of dollars."). In one case, the claim-dispute-resolution entity found that "reim-
bursement of 120% of the Medicare fee schedule would fall within an appropriate range to be
considered reasonable,"' and thus was the equivalent of the "usual and customary" rates. Id.
at 566. If this were binding, then the issue of what constitutes a usual and customary rate in
Florida would be resolved.
139. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 934 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
140. 940 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
141. Id. at 1196.
142. Id. at 1193. Apparently, in 2003, many insurers were paying non-participating pro-
viders 120% of the Medicare reimbursement rate. See Adventist Health Sys.iSunbelt, Inc., 934
So. 2d at 603; Baycare Health Sys. Inc., 940 So. 2d at 566.
143. See Health Options, Inc., 940 So. 2d at 1198.
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tiplier of the Medicare reimbursement rate. 44 Nevertheless, this statement
was not relevant to the court's resolution of the case and thus, as non-binding
dicta, may have little precedential value.
In Baker County Medical Services, Inc. v. Aetna Health Management,
LLC,145 the First District Court of Appeal finally provided some guidance on
how courts should construe the term "usual and customary provider
charges."'146 In this case, Baker County Medical Services, a rural hospital,
provided emergency care for subscribers to two HMOs. 4" The insurer did
not have contracts with the hospital. 148 The hospital would bill the HMOs at
its "charge master" rate. 149 The HMOs, however, would send the providers
checks for a lesser amount and marked as "payment in full."'5° Accordingly,
the hospital filed suit for declaratory relief seeking a judicial interpretation of
the meaning of "usual and customary provider charges.''.
At a bench trial, the trial court determined that the "usual and customary
provider charges for similar services" was a question of fact "to be deter-
mined from the consideration of different factors, including but not limited to
amounts billed and amounts received by the provider for payment of the sim-
ilar services."' 52 The trial court further explained that this calculation should
include Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates. 
53
On appeal, the First District Court, noting that the statute did not in-
clude any definition of "charges," looked to Black's Law Dictionary and
concluded that "ordinary and customary provider charges" was the equiva-
lent of fair market value."5 The court defined fair market value as "the price
that a willing buyer will pay and a willing seller will accept in an arm's-
length transaction."'' 55  The court then held that Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement rates had to be excluded from the calculation because these
rates were not indicative of what a "willing seller" would accept because
medical providers are required by law to provide emergency care to the Med-
144. Id. at 1197.
145. 31 So. 3d 842 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
146. See id. at 844.
147. Id. at 843.
148. Id. at 844.
149. Id. The Court defined the "charge master" rate as the maximum charges which the
hospital had a statutory duty to report to the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA)
in accord with section 408.061 of the Florida Statutes. Baker Cnty. Med. Servs., Inc., 31 So.
3d at 843-44.
150. Id. at 844.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 845.
153. Id.
154. Baker Cnty. Med. Servs., Inc., 31 So. 3d at 845.
155. Id.
[Vol. 35
22
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 7
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss1/7
HEALTH CARE REFORM
icare and Medict-' patients.156 And, in such cases, the government agencies
will only reimburse the providers the rates the agencies have established un-
ilaterally. 157 The exclusion of Medicare and Medicaid rates should only ap-
ply when dealing with providers which do not have the right to refuse to treat
patients covered by these programs, such as hospitals providing emergency
care.5 8 The court also did not indicate whether a trier of fact could consider
workers' compensation fee schedules in evaluating fair market value.
The appellate court, in excluding Medicare and Medicaid reimburse-
ment rates, ignored the fact, however, that the government must reimburse
unwilling providers at a fair rate. Otherwise, accepting the court's finding
that participation in Medicare and Medicaid was involuntary in this case, the
providers could challenge the government's actions under the Takings
Clause if the compensation were not just.159 In fact, this is why the finder of
fact should consider the governmental reimbursement rates in determining
the fair market value in non-contract cases. The court should give deference,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the government will act in
accord with the constitution and compensate the health care providers at a
reasonable rate. Thus, the government rate should at least be presumed to be
a reasonable rate. Whether it represents a "usual and customary charge" is
another issue for the finder of fact to decide.
A presumption that the usual and customary provider charge can be cal-
culated based on government reimbursement rates that providers accept
would not infringe upon the legislature's statutory scheme. The legislature
has given the courts the responsibility of making a factual determination of
what the "usual and customary provider charges" are. The legislature has not
defined these terms in the statutes, thus leaving it to the courts to interpret the
meaning of this phrase. In the absence of a statutory definition, the courts
have great latitude in construing the meaning of these terms. A court should
not be able to establish an absolute value for such charges, such as equating
the "reasonable and customary charge" to always be 125% of the Medicare
reimbursable rate. That is a decision for the legislative branch. But by es-
tablishing a presumptively reasonable rate, the court would merely be shift-
156. Id. at 845-46.
157. Id. at 845.
158. See id. at 846. Although the court did not specifically state that in non-emergency
cases the Medicare rates might be evidence of fair market value, the court implied this by
indicating that the fees were only being excluded in this case because the court determined the
hospital had no choice but to treat such patients because of state and federal law.
159. See Tammy Lundstrum, Note, Under-Reimbursement of Medicaid and Medicare
Hospitalizations as an Unconstitutional Taking of Hospital Services, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1243,
1248-54 (2004).
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ing the burden to the party that disputes the presumptive rate. If the provider
were to consider the presumptive rate too low, the provider could produce
evidence that the provider has contracted for higher rates with other insurers.
An insurer that believes the presumptive rate is too high can produce evi-
dence of contracts that it has with other providers in the area for similar ser-
vices. The Medicare rate should at least in some way correlate to actual cost.
Rather than presuming a set percentage of Medicare as the reasonable rate, a
court could allow the insurer--or the patient if the patient is self-paying-to
offer general evidence of how much more private payers on average pay in
comparison to Medicare reimbursement rates in that area.16° A provider
could challenge these findings by showing that its actual costs were higher
than Medicare allows. The provider could also proffer evidence that the par-
ticular procedure was more complicated than the "similar" procedures used
by the trier of fact for comparison.
The court in Baker County Medical Services equated the "usual and
customary provider charges" with fair market value. 16 1 The court defined
"fair market value" as "the price that a willing buyer will pay and a willing
seller will accept in an arm's-length transaction."' 62 Providers are likely to
argue that the "fair market value" for their services should be higher because
of their experience or special training. This argument, however, should have
little weight in the case of an HMO subscriber seeking emergency medical
services unless the provider could show that the patient chose that provider
because of the provider's training. In the case of an HMO subscriber, how-
ever, the insurance policy does not permit the patient to choose out-of-
network providers. 63 Section 641.513 of the Florida Statutes, however, only
applies where the patient is seeking emergency services and care.' 64 In such
situations, the patient will likely be choosing a facility because of its proxim-
ity, or someone else may have selected the facility because of the patient's
condition, preventing him or her from making such a determination. Thus,
while a provider's level of experience may play a factor in justifying a higher
rate for non-emergency situations, the same rationale should not apply to
section 641.513 of the Florida Statutes.
160. See, e.g., WILL Fox & JOHN PICKERING, MILLIMAN, HOSPITAL & PHYSICIAN COST
SHIFr: PAYMENT LEVEL COMPARISON OF MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND COMMERCIAL PAYERS
(2008), available at http://www.bcbs.comlnewslbluetvradio/cost-shift-study-2008/us-cost-
shift-20081208.pdf (finding that Commercial rates were about 28% higher than Medicare
rates).
161. Baker Cnty. Med. Servs., Inc., 31 So. 3d at 845.
162. Id. (citing U.S. v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973)).
163. HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 5.
164. FLA. STAT. § 641.513 (2010).
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VI. UCR AND HIGHER HEALTH CARE COSTS
The uncertain nature of "usual and customary" charges not only affects
those who face uncertain balance billing as a result of such uncertainty, but
also affects the overall cost of health care by increasing insurance premiums.
This uncertainty affects insurance costs because insurers set their premiums
based in part on their expected payouts. If an insurer cannot predict the
amount that it will have to payout to cover medical claims, then it will in-
crease premiums to cover this uncertainty. Furthermore, the uncertainty
creates litigation costs that must also be covered by the insurance premiums.
The cost to a single insurer is not the only reason that this uncertainty
leads to higher costs. Another reason is that this uncertainty creates barriers
to entry for new insurers.165 According to the American Medical Association
(AMA), "Competition in the health insurance industry is disappearing...
,166 The AMA reports that in twenty-four states, two insurers had a com-
bined market share of seventy percent or more. 67 Furthermore, in more than
half of the markets, one insurer controlled at least fifty percent of the mar-
ket. 168 The AMA recommends that the Department of Justice should investi-
gate if there are any antitrust implications of this consolidation. 169 Although
the AMA cites the rising premiums as the reason for its concern, the AMA is
probably more concerned that dominant insurers will be able to dictate the
prices that its members must accept for their services in a given market.
70
Actually, however, the presence of a dominant insurer does not necessarily
lead to lower fees for medical providers.' 7' In fact, under the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act, insurers may have little incentive to negotiate
for lower fees.172 A group insurer will have to return any premiums in excess
of eighty-five percent of the amounts it paid out to reimburse medical costs
during a particular year. 73 This combination of a market dominated by a few
165. Id. at7.
166. News Release, Am. Med. Ass'n, AMA Study Shows Competition Disappearing in
the Health Insurance Industry (Feb. 23, 2010),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/health-insurance-competition.shtml.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See INCREASING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 53, at 7.
171. See Ken Terry, More Insurance Competition Will Not Reduce Costs, BNET HEALTH
CARE BLOG (Sept. 7, 2009), http://industry.bnet.com/healthcare/10001113/more-insurance-
competition-will-not-reduce-costs/?tag=content;selector-perfector.
172. See Rexford E. Santerre, Competition Beats Regulation; Aggressive Negotiation with
Providers Can Contain Premiums, WASH. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at B1.
173. See id.
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insurers and a requirement that the insurers must payout certain amounts for
actual medical coverage could lead to uncontrolled increases in both insur-
ance premiums and medical fees.
The reason that making the amounts insurers are required to pay out-of-
network providers clearer could help with overall insurance premiums is
because this uncertainty creates barriers to entry for potential new insurers.174
To compete in a new medical market, the insurer would have to negotiate
discount rates similar to those of its established competitors. 175 Considering
that the published rates and discounted rates can differ by such large factors,
the risk of having to pay non-discounted rates could make entry into new
markets commercially unfeasible. 76 On the other hand, insurers could enter
markets slowly by building up small local networks knowing that in emer-
gency situations, they would only be required to pay a market rate similar to
what the more dominant insurers are paying. The courts would be instru-
mental in making this possible by establishing that usual and customary rates
are determined by the amounts providers are accepting as payment, and by
establishing a measurable presumptive value in the absence of further data.
This could also create an incentive for providers to negotiate contract rates
with these new insurers, again increasing the ability for the new insurers to
compete in the market.
Some people argue that increased competition among insurers will ac-
tually cause overall healthcare costs to increase because medical providers
would have more leverage in negotiating with each insurer. 77 Further, some
people have expressed concern that increased price transparency may also
lead to higher costs as the providers who currently agree to costs that are
below usual and customary amounts would demand more. 78 Although those
at the high end of the scale could be pressured to lower costs to some extent,
this lowering might not offset the increases demanded by the lower-cost pro-
viders.179 Although no one can predict the true effect of increased transpa-
rency in actual medical costs and/or increased competition among insurers,
the increased transparency would allow policymakers to closely monitor the
effects. If costs did rise as a result of transparency, state legislatures could
implement maximum fee schedules based on the new data that would be
available to them in making their policy decisions.
174. See INCREASING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 53, at 7.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 4.
177. See id. at 4-6.
178. See INCREASING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 53, at 4-6.
179. See id. at 8.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Statutes that require courts to calculate "usual, customary, and reasona-
ble" values for medical services using traditional discovery principles have
contributed to both to the problem of a lack of consumer protection from
balance billing as well as increased uncertainty (and likely price increases) in
health insurance markets. The difficulty is unique to the nature of the health
care industry and the third-party paymenet system that has evolved around
the healthcare market. In particular, the problem relates to the confidential
agreements between insurers and providers that has evolved as the method of
reimbursement in most cases. Combined with these confidential pricing rela-
tionships is the public policy that our legislatures want the healthcare market
to be somewhat market driven in the sense that our policymakers have
wanted the compensation of medical providers to be based on market rates,
rather than on a government established fee schedule. The problem, howev-
er, is that because of the lack of transparency as to what providers are actual-
ly paid, insurers and providers often cannot agree what the fair market value
should be when they are in situations where they have not pre-negotiated a
rate and statutory or common law requires reimbursement based on some
market rate.
The courts have also been an inefficient place to set guidelines for two
reasons. First, determining the true market rate has proven to be elusive due
to the unavailability of reliable data regarding the true "usual and customary"
value for medical services in a given area. Many courts have been unwilling
to use other statutory fee schedules to substitute for the indeterminable
"usual and customary" value absent some clear direction from the legislature.
The greatest hope for the future may be with the creation of a truly indepen-
dent non-profit organization which will manage a database of all medical fee
payments across the country. Perhaps the funds that several large insurers
have agreed to contribute as part of a settlement with the State of New York,
combined with the availability of federal grant money to create Data Reim-
bursement Centers pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act will make such a database a reality.
Nevertheless, in the interim, until such a database is operational and
courts have had an opportunity to rule on the reliability of its data collection
methods, a solution is still needed. While the best solution would come from
the legislature in terms of either a maximum fee schedule or a presumptively
reasonable fee schedule, in the absence of such legislation, state courts
should consider imposing their own presumptions on reasonable rates based
on a multiplier of the Medicare reimbursement fee schedules or a State's
own workers' compensation fee schedules. By creating a presumption, the
courts would only be shifting the burden of producing evidence that the pre-
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sumptive rate is not the true market rate to the parties that would most likely
have evidence to the contrary. For example, if a medical provider truly col-
lects more than the presumptive rate from most other private insurers, the
provider could easily produce this evidence to the court--or possibly even
the other party before any litigation begins--to rebut the presumptive rate.
Thus, there would be no overreaching by the court and when a major medical
emergency forces a person to seek care at the nearest hospital, he or she will
have a better understanding of what to expect.
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